November 10, 2003

Interesting Theory About the Troop Withdrawals

I initially figured that the President may have been drawing down troops to coincide with the 2004 election. But go to this post on Winds of Change and read the two comments by Trent Telenko. His basic theory is that the pattern of troop withdrawals from Iraq suggest the reconstitution of an invasion force rather than a strategic defense force, and that the likely target will be Iran, around the time of the 2004 election. (Before or after is anyone's guess.) That corresponds to a strategy for relieving some of the pressure on Iraq by staunching the flow of outside agitators coming into Iraq through Iran. Trent argues that the pattern of troop rotations, training, and redeployment correspond to a classic pattern used by the American military during WWII in the Pacific, with the island-hopping invasions in the Azores. The period of the pattern is longer, though, because Middle Eastern countries are larger than Pacific islands, requiring a longer time to build up the force. Interesting theory.

Some key points of Telenko's theory:

Then I read somewhere Thursday or Friday on the Early Bird that 37% of that 105,000 strong force is going to be Guard/Reserve. Add in the Marines rotating in with two Stryker brigades and it looks like the majority of the Army heavy forces and 18th Airborne Corps going to be out of Iraq. Now add into the mix Bush's Democracy speech on the need to remake the Arab world democratically (that included a hint to the Egyptians that they are going to suffer an involuntary regime change). A horse of a different color emerged for me.

First, take six months of down time, catching up higher schooling, rebuilding equipment and spares stockpiles for these returning units. Then take another six months of training to bring those Regular Army combat units back up to peak fighting pitch. You then see a window of opportunity for a new American ground campaign opening up. In so many words, the Navy isn't the only service planning on major surges of forces to forward deployments. Rumsfeld isn't rebuilding a strategic reserve, he is building a Strategic Invasion Force. I think we are going to have to plan for a "pizza watch" on the Pentagon to start just in time for the final days of the 2004 election campaign and running through the early winter months of 2005.

We are looking at an operational pattern similar to what was used for ground forces in the Pacific theater of WW2. America wins a victory with combat forces, replaces them with other troops to mop up, rebuilds the combat forces for the next operation, and then strikes again. Except Arab Tyrannies are bigger, and thus the operational pauses between invasions are longer, than Pacific atolls.

and in a separate post:

The nature of the units being recalled is a major reason for my thinking this is an invasion force.

We have the whole of the 18th Airborne Corps coming home. As Cato noted above, We also have the 3rd Mech. Infantry Division home now with the 1st Mech. Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, 3rd Armored Cavaly (sic) regiment (brigade sized) set to follow.

These are not the units we would have in reserve if we were plainning (sic) for a war with Korea as mountain fighting requires the kind of infantry forces we have deployed for stability operations in Iraq.

Read the whole thing on Winds of Change, including other comments.

Update: As Mitch points out below, in a comment, this theory may not be falsifiable. I don't know enough about the topic to tell whether (as Trent contends) the troop withdrawals would actually be different for a strategic or an invasion force, but it stands to reason that a strict FIFO logic would be pulling out the forces necessary for an invasion, because they've been there the longest (since they were used in the invasion).

Posted by Demosophist at November 10, 2003 01:31 PM | TrackBack
Comments

Trent's theory is unfalsifiable. Withdrawal of heavy and airmobile forces for rebuilding, reconstitution and retraining for a new campaign, or withdrawal of heavy and airmobile forces for rebuilding, reconstitution and retraining for a strategic reserve: these are scenarios that are essentially indistinguishable from each other without documentation of some sort of intent.

The heavy and airmobile units are being withdrawn because they were the units that were sent in, and they're the ones that will be exhausted and in need of refit.

Posted by: Mitch H. at November 10, 2003 06:26 PM

I guess I was sucked in by the contention that a strategic reserve would require "mountain forces," which he contends are being used for stability. That, together with when these "mountain forces" were deployed might have been critical. However, if they were deployer relatively recently then the troop rotations are simply governed by a FIFO logic, except for certain units that are more critical because they have unique capaties for the low intensity combat in the Sunni triangle. And I assumed those probably were not these "mountain forces." Shows how you can get sucked into a conspiracy theory when you have limited knowledge of the topic.

Posted by: Scott (to Mitch) at November 11, 2003 09:59 AM

I missed his point about "mountain forces", which would be airmobile elements and, presumably, the 10th Mountain Division. The 10th Mountain is currently rotating through Afghanistan on a rather heavy basis - they've got two brigade teams deployed over there right now, and one presumes that they'll be continuing to rotate it through that theatre, as we don't really have other forces suitable for mountain missions.

Posted by: Mitch H. at November 11, 2003 03:37 PM

Keep an eye on the 4th ID. They're the Army's showpiece division, and would be right up front on any major offensive.

Posted by: Anticipatory Retaliation (to Scott) at November 11, 2003 03:53 PM

Like they were last spring? Franks used that mistaken impression to achieve operational surprise, or at least tried to. I have to wonder if the Iraqis actually noticed the 4th's showpiece status, though.

Posted by: Mitch H. at November 12, 2003 10:14 AM

The 4th was significant enough to go through all that rigamarole to stage through Turkey. They had enough confidence in the 4th ID to make them the bread and butter of the northern front, had it materialized. Do you remember all the planning that went ahead based on the time it would take to get the 4th ID through the Suez and staged? This time around, particularly since our strategic reserves are starting to get tapped, they'll want the varsity team.

As far as SH noticing goes, keep in mind the recent WaPo article in which Hussein was convinced war would be averted (or at least the ground war) for an eon. I think that the 4th ID (or at least the northern front) played a significant role in that.

Posted by: Anticipatory Retaliation (to Mitch) at November 12, 2003 08:13 PM