I really don't like the sound of this:
Administration officials say it's conceivable that a transfer of power in Iraq could take place even before next year's U.S. presidential election, though officials insist the election is not a factor in the timing.The administration had strong ideas about the process that should be taken toward Iraqi self-governance, and argued at the United Nations in September that before power could be turned over to the Iraqis, a new constitution had to be written and ratified in a referendum and a new government had to be elected.
But after two days of talks with Bremer, the president no longer seems to mind short-circuiting the democratic process that officials say would take too long.
This just doesn't sound like the same Bush who delivered the speach TNR talks about here:
the president provided a thoughtful and stirring and momentous defense of the centrality of democratization to American foreign policy. It was a radical speech, and for once the radicalism of this administration did not seem small or sectarian. It contained arguments, not slogans; a sense of history, not a sense of politics. It was the credo of an idealist, but there was realism in it, too.
I can't figure it out. One day he's talking about making a sacrifice to establish a turning point in history, and the next he's talking about "getting out of town fast." I hate to say it, but this sounds like a Karl Rove thing. If this president plays the Iraq reconstruction "short" he won't get my vote next November, even if I have to vote for Dean or Nader. I just have no tolerance for playing politics with this. Zero. In fact, if Bush is ready to pull out of Iraq prematurely I'm definitely willing to draft someone else to run against him in the Republican primary. His stock will drop so fast it'll make Enron look like a good buy.
I'll wait to see how things shake out, but I didn't like the sound of "Iron Hammer" ether. Firepower isn't the way to win a counter-insergency campaign. What's going on here?
Posted by Demosophist at November 13, 2003 11:28 PM | TrackBackLike you, I worry about the overly rapid transfer of power. However, I also don't believe it. I cannot imagine that Rumsfeld or Rice are dumb enough to actually hand over power to the Iraqi council, especially since it has little popular legitimacy. So I hope this is a meaningless gesture, or at least one where there is less than it sounds like.
And certainly if Bush abandoned Iraq, it would be a disaster. If so, I would be terribly shocked, because it does not at all match my reading of the man or his advisors. I don't think even Colin Powell would abandon Iraq.
I do disagree about "Iron Hammer." There are three theaters in this war, and this affects all:
1) Iraq itself, especially the Sunni triangle. The US has been taking a continuous low level of casualties without any visible responses. It turns out that the response was aparently to quietly gather intelligence and set traps. Thus the other night everyone who attacked US facilities in Baghdad was rapidly targetted, either with ground forces, air forces, artillery, or combinations of the above. This not only eliminated enemy effectives, but it has a significant psychological component which I think is especially useful in that part of the world: The US is there to build a democracy, but is willing to kill when attacked, and willing to do so by surprise and in effective ways.
This is not a classic counter-insurgency war. The insurgents have no real constituency, no real ideology, and little serious outside support. They Because of this, violent tactics may be quite effective. Essentially, we have part of the country that was not really conquered, it was occupied with little fighting, and that part has the most hostile population - those who gained the most from Saddam's power. The population of much of this area (including parts of Baghdad) can still be considered an unconquered enemy, not a guerilla force. Furthermore, the majority of the country wants these people to be defeated (frankly, they'd like us to kill a lot of them).
2) Outside of Iraq, the Muslim world, especially in the Middle East, is a theater of psychological warfare. For a very long time we failed to demonstrate our will to really fight it out with middle eastern enemies. Succeeding in a counterinsurgency campaign by a combination of infrequent sudden violence, movement controls, and acts of reconstruction and general good will should destroy the fantasies of many in that area.
3) Inside the US. Unfortunately, Vietnam was was lost in the Congress of the US, not in the field of battle. Our enemy hopes to do the same here, and many people, especially those who were anti-war students during Vietnam and are now in positions of power and influence are quite determined to do it again. Their main motivation seems to be an irrational hatred of George Bush, but they will seize on any excuse to to demoralize the American population, which is the most important one in this whole exercise.
Some retaliation and some battlefield successes are needed for the home front. They are useful to defang those who would pre-emptively lose the larger war by abandoning Iraq or handing it to hostile, corrupt and ineffective international organizations such as the UN.
I had been wondering why the US seemed to suffer attack after attack in the Green Zone without retaliating. We had the technology for precision retaliation, with good surveillance aircraft, improving local humint, and technology such as counterbattery radar radar, but we didn't do anything. Well, we are doing something. We were watching, listening and tracking. Now we are destroying.
I would expect that this is cheered by most of the population of Baghdad, and those who dislike are unlikely to be turned around in any case. Likewise, the ending of two ambushes of our troops in Fallujah by 500lb bombs was another message: Fallujah is now an enemy city, and we will destroy those who commit or allow attacks upon us.
Also, keep in mind that there are significant special forces still operating in Iraq. They are not getting a lot of publicity, but they are experts at counterinsurgency. There are hunter-killer teams going after Baathist leaders. There are other teams taking out many infiltrators before they can cause much trouble (which also sends a message back to other potential terrorists, as people they know go to Iraq to fight the great Jihad, and just disappear, time after time).
It would seem to me that our biggest failing is the lack of adequate information and propaganda outlets. Pro-American Iraqi bloggers have been complaining about this, noting that they get much of their news from Al Arabia or Al Jazeera, both inflitrated with Baathists (and probably Islamists) and both extremely biased. The US needs to rapidly institute a Radio Free Iraq and recreate the Iraq Satellite channel, and then provide accurate reporting with a positive spin (i.e. show the real news, good or bad, and in between give useful information and positive information such as Chief Wiggles' toy drive or a school rebuilding or voting in villages or whatever. I think we should also exert strong pressures to force Al Jazeera and Al Arabia to be more fair. As this war proceeds, we may even want to shut them down, by jamming or other forceful means if necessary, but only if we provide a good alternative ahead of time.
John
Posted by: John Moore (Useful Fools) at November 14, 2003 02:07 AMJohn:
This is not a classic counter-insurgency war. The insurgents have no real constituency, no real ideology, and little serious outside support. They Because of this, violent tactics may be quite effective. Essentially, we have part of the country that was not really conquered, it was occupied with little fighting, and that part has the most hostile population - those who gained the most from Saddam's power. The population of much of this area (including parts of Baghdad) can still be considered an unconquered enemy, not a guerilla force. Furthermore, the majority of the country wants these people to be defeated (frankly, they'd like us to kill a lot of them).
OK, but strictly speaking parts of this statement are at odds with other parts. I have been assuming that the majority of the population want us there, which even includes either a majority or sizable minority of the Sunni. That leaves either a sizable minority or a bare majority who don't, and one might expect those people to be an "unconquered enemy," as you say. However, if that's the case then they'd also be the population that hides and supports the "insurgents." And it leaves us in a quandary since if we are too heavy-handed the rest of that population will support the insurgents. I guess I'll just have to wait, to see if this "iron hammer" is the right application of force at the right time. But I've mainly became alarmed because, superficially at least, such a public strike together with talk about pulling out more quickly than we had thought to do sends a message that we lack resolve and the attack is just a show of force to cover a retreat.
I guess I need some reassurance that the above is not the case. And I also need information that reassures me we aren't making more enemies by doing this. The BBC had a rather lengthy report yesterday during which that made all sorts of insinuations that the Bush Administration had radically changed its position on withdrawal, and were seeking ways to reconcile that change with the expectations they had sewn about building a democracy in Iraq. Of course, one would expect the BEEB to see the negative elements in anything having to do with Bush, but when I saw virtually the same story of FOX I got really worried. I have seen very little discussion of this in the blogosphere, so far.
Thanks for taking the time to work through this with me. I suspect we'll know more in a few days. And I really hope you're right that this is a relatively meaningless gesture. I'm not sure who it's supposed to mollify, but it sure hasn't worked with me. Maybe it's a strategy to mollify his political opponents and put them off guard. But the thing that bothers me is that it starts to set expectations that we'll be out soon, so fits in with this overall trend of not being willing to ask the public to make any sacrifices. And a year or so down the road people are going to start demanding why we aren't out of Baghdad yet. I don't know... but if he starts to lose his base by appearing too conciliatory he may start to slide out of the picture pretty quickly. There's something about this business of talking tough and acting conciliatory that just strikes me a doing things backwards. I hope he doesn't find, to use the words of a friend of mine: "that he's treading on thin water."
Posted by: Scott (to John) at November 14, 2003 09:10 AM