Demosophia

The 9-11 Commission Report Is Less Than It Seems

My assessment of the 9-11 Commission Report inverts Mark Twain's statement about the music of the celebrated German composer, Richard Wagner. It's worse than it sounds. I haven't seen much in the report that wasn't known before, or that wasn't included either in the Feith memo or discussed in Stephen Hayes' original Weekly Standard article or followup, or that wasn't referenced either by Jay Epstein's original Slate article, or by Laurie Mylroie. Unless I'm mistaken this Commission Report is simply another in a series of unremarkable, and methodologically flawed, interpretations.

If the commission claims that there was 'no credible evidence' that the meeting between Atta and the IIS agent took place in Prague, it seems a matter of semantics involving what one means by "credible evidence." There was, at the very least, an eyewitness placing someone who looked like Atta in the company of someone who looked like the IIS agent. In addition, Epstein holds that Czech Intelligence had an entry from the IIS agent's calendar indicating a meeting with "the Hamburg student" on that day. I'm also fairly sure, from Epstein's account, that there was at least some evidence placing Atta in Prague on the day in question, though I'm not certain about that. The evidence is open to more than one interpretation, which means it's not "conclusive," as I've already pointed out. But it at least seems credible, doesn't it?

credible 1: offering reasonable grounds for being believed as in witnesses offer reasonable grounds for believing the account of an accident 2: of sufficient capability to be militarily effective, as in the capability of forces make a deterrent militarily effective. (Merriam-Webster)

The only reason this is now not considered "credible evidence," as far as I can tell, is the following:

In its report on the Sept. 11 plot, the commission staff disclosed for the first time F.B.I. evidence that strongly suggested that Mr. Atta was in the United States at the time of the supposed Prague meeting.

The report cited a photograph taken by a bank surveillance camera in Virginia showing Mr. Atta withdrawing money on April 4, 2001, a few days before the supposed Prague meeting on April 9, and records showing his cellphone was used on April 6, 9, 10 and 11 in Florida. (James Risen, NYT, "No Evidence of Meeting")

I have to confess, I really thought they had more than this. You can simply discount the cell phone evidence, if there's no triangulation (for instance talking to witnesses who received his calls and can verify that it was Atta they were talking to). That isn't "credible evidence" any more than an ID without your picture is credible evidence of your identity for any sort of official business. And clearly Atta would have had more than enough time, if he were in Virginia on April 4, to go to Dulles or Reagan, or BWI, or Richmond airport and board a flight to Europe in plenty of time to meet with an Iraqi agent in Prague.

So is this all they have? You'll note that even the Commission Report doesn't make the claim that the evidence proves Atta wasn't in Prague. They merely say it "strongly suggests." But if ones intent were to deceive, then surely the evidence that one intends to be deceptive would "strongly suggest" the deceptive inference, wouldn't it? Either you can place Atta in Florida or Virginia or anywhere other than Prague on the date and time in question or you can't. And if you can't then you ain't got nuttin', honey.

This is one of the reasons I don't trust commission reports. They are political statements, not statements of scientific findings. In many cases (as in the case of the Coleman Commission, for instance) they directly contradict the scientific findings. It isn't so much that they're biased, as that they're non-rigorous. And, of course, a lack of rigor certainly facilitates bias.

And there's another issue that comes into play for those who insist that this demonstrates that "Bush lied." Apart from the possibility that Bush may not have had access to the above evidence "strongly suggesting" Atta's whereabouts, there is this clincher: The decision rule while the threat exists is different from the decision rule that comes into play once the threat has been removed. In other words, now that Saddam is no longer in power in Iraq, and therefore the threat of a Saddam/Qaeda link involving WMD is no longer capable of causing harm, we don't have to... and indeed we shouldn't presume the meeting took place. Before the removal of the threat, in other words, our operational hypothesis is that the meeting took place in spite of the fact that we have only inconclusive evidence that it did. We do have evidence, that is open to some other interpretation, but it's still "credible." Once the threat has been removed the null hypothesis becomes "no meeting." At that point we must find sufficient evidence to reject the "no meeting" assumption. As I've explained elsewhere that has to take advantage of some physical principle, such as the fact that a person can't be in two places at once.

The decision rule you use is related to the consequence of error. Naturally, you adopt the assumption that's associated with the least harmful consequences, should that assumption prove erroneous. And that's the way you handle things in an uncertain world.

Plus, of course, the likelihood of the Iraq/Qaeda connection was not the only consideration involved in the decision to invade Iraq, and may not even have been the most important national security consideration.

What really bothers me, as one who'd just as soon not vote for Bush, is why the heck do his opponents insist he was lying when it's clear that there's no real evidence that he did? I suspect the answer is simply that "Bush lied" is their operational hypothesis.

Posted by Demosophist at June 18, 2004 01:57 AM | TrackBack